Most philosophers agree that causal knowledge is essential to decisionmaking: agents should choose from the available options those that probably cause the outcomes that they want. This book argues against this theory and in favour of Evidential or Bayesian Decision Theory, which emphasizes the symptomatic value of options over their causal role. It examines a variety of settings, including economic theory, quantum mechanics and philosophical thought-experiments, where causal knowledge seems to make a practical difference. The arguments make novel use of machinery from other areas of philosophical inquiry, including first-person epistemology and the free-will debate. The book also illustrates the applicability of decision theory itself to questions about the direction of time and the special epistemic status of agents.
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Preface
Causality is a pointless superstition. These days it would take more than one book to persuade anyone of that. This book focuses on the 'pointless' bit, not the 'superstition' bit. I take for granted that there are causal relations and ask what doing so is good for. More narrowly still, I ask whether causal belief plays a special role in decision. My argument that it does not consists largely of schemes for extracting money from the people who think it does. I conduct the argument using the framework of decision theory. Decision theory is convenient for this purpose because it (a) quantifies causal beliefs and (b) isolates their role in practical deliberation. Because of this aim the book couldn't serve as a stand-alone introduction to decision theory. Anyone who took it that way would find it distorted and lacunary. Distorted because of the focus on the dominance principle at the expense of almost everything else that Savage's axioms entail; lacunary because of the complete absence from the story of any approach outside the Ramsey-Savage expected-utility paradigm.
Anyway, many excellent introductions to the subject are already available at various levels of mathematical sophistication. For instance, Peterson 2009 is written at a mathematically elementary level, Gilboa 2009 and Kreps 1988 are more difficult and Fishburn 1970 is mathematically fairly advanced. This book presupposes no mathematical knowledge beyond completely elementary set theory and probability.
But it probably could function as a philosophical companion to any such introduction. Its central topic is perhaps the main debate in the philosophical foundations of decision theory. That subject has a bearing on more traditional preoccupations of metaphysics, including causality itself, the asymmetry of time and the nature of self-knowledge. Pursuing it also forces us to touch upon live issues in psychology, economics, the theory of voting and the foundations of quantum mechanics. So I hope in these chapters to illustrate why the philosophy of decision theory is important, or at least interesting, even if you are not a philosopher of decision theory.
